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BANKRUPT PROFITS:
THE CREDIT INDUSTRY’S BUSINESS MODEL FOR POSTBANKRUPTCY LENDING
Katherine Porter∗
Consumer credit and consumer bankruptcy filings have grown rapidly over the last two decades,
and several researchers have attempted to understand the relationship between these two
intertwined features of the modern American economy. Teasing out causation is almost
impossible, as consumer advocates lay blame on the industry and the industry responds by citing
the same data to show consumer misbehavior. Using a novel vantage point, this analysis
examines what the credit industry's behavior toward recently bankrupt families reveals about its
internal profit models and the likely causes of consumer bankruptcy. The empirical evidence on
postbankruptcy credit solicitation belies the industry’s characterizations of bankrupt families as
opportunistic or strategic actors. Original data from longitudinal interviews with consumer
debtors show that lenders target recent bankrupts, sending these families repeated offers for
unsecured and secured loans. The modern credit industry sees bankrupt families as lucrative
targets for high-yield lending, a reality that has important implications for developing optimal
consumer credit policy and bankruptcy law.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent reform of America’s bankruptcy law favored the interests of creditors. In the
two years since the reform, obtaining consumer bankruptcy relief has become more expensive,
more time-consuming, and more difficult.1 These legal changes were motivated by a perceived
need to reduce the incentives and ability of consumer debtors to “overborrow” and then seek
relief from the bankruptcy system.2 This strategic behavior model was arguably more a matter of
perception and politics than documented empirical reality.3 Nonetheless, this vision of financial
distress dominated the public discourse as the justification for reducing the availability and scope
of consumer bankruptcy relief.
The credit industry aggressively promoted an understanding of bankruptcy that focused
on personal responsibility for financial outcomes. In its view, many bankruptcy debtors were
prodigal spenders who engaged in irresponsible financial activity when they accumulated debts.
Bankrupt families were assailed for lacking the moral conviction to repay their debts.
Bankruptcy was proffered as an easy way out that attracted consumers who were intent on
gaming the credit system.4 The credit industry convinced Congress that curtailing bankruptcy
1

See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweatbox” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 375, 377
(cataloging changes to Bankruptcy Code that impose burdens on consumer debtors); NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER
BANKR. ATTY’S, BANKRUPTCY REFORM’S IMPACT: WHERE ARE ALL THE “DEADBEATS?” (2006), available at
http://www.nacba.com/files/main_page/022206NACBAbankruptcyreformstudy.pdf; Henry J. Sommer, Trying to
Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005”, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191 (2005).
2
See Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavorialism,
and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (2006) (“Congress recently enacted
legislation motivated by the perception that rational consumers act strategically when they borrow money and file
for bankruptcy.”); Richard L. Wiener et al., Unwrapping Assumptions: Applying Social Analytic Jurisprudence to
Consumer Bankruptcy Education Requirements and Policy, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453, 459 (2005)
3
See Mechele Dickerson, Regulating Bankruptcy: Public Choice, Ideology & Beyond, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. ___
(forthcoming 2007) (describing how opponents of bankruptcy reforms used data to refute allegations of strategic
debtors); ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS
AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 71-80 (2003) (describing the “myth of immoral debtor” and evaluating evidence
to support this conception of bankruptcy filers).
4
See Dickerson, supra note 3, at nn. 168-169 (“Supporters [of BAPCPA and its predecessors] focused on the
culture of bankruptcy and the importance of ‘personal responsibility,’ and suggested that debtors lacked integrity
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relief was sound social policy.5 Such reforms were supposed to dampen prodigality and
encourage consumers to make prudent financial decisions. This focus on debtor behavior led to
bankruptcy reform that intended to alter the incentives and practices of consumers.
The credit industry’s lending decisions were not subjected to similar scrutiny to that
imposed on debtors’ borrowing or bankruptcy decisions. Nor were lenders held to the same
moral standard for evaluating the appropriateness of their financial practices as debtors were.
Creditors’ strategic behaviors, and the consequences of their lending activity, were not an
integral part of the debate over bankruptcy reform.6 The financial practices of creditors were
never closely examined, perhaps in part due to difficulty in obtaining proprietary lending data.
The fragmented regulatory framework for consumer lending also hindered efforts to identify
problems in the consumer credit market. Further, theoretical scholarship has emphasized the
law’s role in shaping debtors’ incentives, rather than evaluating how creditors react to
bankruptcy laws. These factors combined to shroud the realities of consumer credit marketing
and lending. While the amount of consumer credit had obviously mushroomed in the past
decade, the blame for the increased bankruptcy rate that accompanied this credit expansion was
put squarely on the shoulders of consumers rather than creditors. This focus on debtors has
distracted scholars and lawmakers from examining how lenders contribute to financial distress
and from considering how bankruptcy law influences creditor behavior.
because they no longer felt any personal obligation to pay debts they could afford to repay.”); Mann, Sweatbox,
supra note 1, at 377 (“The catch phrase in the legislative history was the ‘bankruptcy of convenience.’”).
5
As Mechele Dickerson has explained, bankruptcy reform raised ideological issues that may have persuaded
individual members of Congress to favor the legislation. See Dickerson, supra note 3, at 1. However, the standard
characterization of the legislation is a public choice story that strongly emphasizes the consumer credit industry’s
capture of Congress through lobbying and financial contributions. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 613 (2002) (opining that thenpending bankruptcy bill was “poster child” of result of imbalance of money and power between interest groups).
6
Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 376 “(Proponents spent much less time discussing the economics of the
consumer credit industry or the business models of those most affected by consumer bankruptcy.”); John A.E.
Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 405, 407 (“Instead of, or at least in
addition to, targeting debtors, Congress should fix its sights on creditors . . .”).
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This Article analyzes original empirical data from first-ever detailed longitudinal study of
bankrupt families. This novel postbankruptcy vantage point offers a fresh perspective on the
credit industry’s beliefs about the causes and consequences of consumer bankruptcy. The
findings document how the credit industry responds to consumers’ bankruptcies, exposing the
credit industry’s bankruptcy rhetoric to empirical challenge. If even a modest proportion of
bankruptcy debtors are untrustworthy deadbeats who behave in immoral or strategic ways, the
credit industry should be reluctant to lend to these families. These families have self-identified
themselves as “profligates” by filing bankruptcy, thereby giving lenders hard, public evidence
that they borrowed and did not repay. Even after bankruptcy, these families will have ample
opportunity to avoid repaying new postbankruptcy loans. Indeed, the credit industry’s portrayal
of bankruptcy debtors suggests that these families are skilled at evading collectors, hiding assets,
shielding income from garnishment, and relying on state laws such as exemptions to prevent
legal action. Faced with this knowledge, lenders should eschew bankruptcy debtors. Creditors
should purge these families from their solicitation lists, and when approached by these families,
demand security for any loan.
In fact, the data show the opposite. This Article’s key finding is that creditors repeatedly
solicit debtors to borrow after bankruptcy. Families receive dozens of offers for new credit in
each month immediately after their bankruptcy discharge. Some offers specifically target these
families based on their recent financial problems, using bankruptcy as an advertising lure. Other
credit offers emanate from the very same lenders that the families could not repay before
bankruptcy. While not every lender will accept a “profligate” bankrupt as a customer, debtors
report being overwhelmed after bankruptcy with a variety of credit solicitations from many
sources. Lenders offer families most types of secured and unsecured loans. The widespread
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efforts of creditors to lure bankrupt families into new borrowing relationships stand in stark
contrast to the credit industry’s portrayal of these families’ propensity for honoring their
obligations.
While credit card solicitations are ubiquitous, most families report receiving offers for car
loans, second mortgages, live checks and other credit lines. Two paradoxes emerge. Debtors
report more difficulty in obtaining secured loans than unsecured loans. This outcome is
surprising, as collateral is thought to mitigate credit risk.7 Despite bemoaning the risks created by
immoral and strategic borrowers, many lenders do not bother to secure loans to bankrupt
families. Also, debtors who chose Chapter 13 (repayment) bankruptcy instead of Chapter 7
(liquidation) bankruptcy have fewer opportunities to borrow. Rather than identifying them to
creditors as a “responsible” borrower, repaying a portion of their past debts actually hinders a
family’s access to future credit. Creditors’ actual behavior undermines the industry’s purported
policy goal of channeling more families into Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7. On the whole, the
credit industry treats former Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors as valuable customers, seeking to
profit by loading these families with new debt immediately after bankruptcy.
The vast opportunities to borrow after bankruptcy belie the credit industry’s assertions
about the immoral or strategic behavior of bankruptcy debtors. When the empirical data are
juxtaposed against creditors’ rhetoric in support of restricting bankruptcy relief, the gulf between
creditors’ actions and words is enormous. Despite their disparagement of the character of
bankrupt families, lenders actively solicit them as future customers. This empirical evidence
suggests that the credit industry takes one view of bankruptcy debtors to Congress, the media,
and public, but it itself literally “banks” on a different view of bankruptcy debtors. While the

7

See Richard Hynes & Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
168, 171 (2002) (citing research on reasons for existence of secured credit).
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data are not conclusive on bankruptcy causation, creditors’ interest in lending to bankrupt
families is consistent with acceptance of an adverse events model of bankruptcy. If the vast
majority of families are unable to pay because of an external financial shock such as illness or
injury, creditors need not refrain from soliciting bankruptcy debtors as customers out of serious
concern that these families will borrow intending to evade future obligations using strategies
other than bankruptcy. The strong overall pattern of credit offers to bankruptcy debtors suggests
that creditors themselves reject a view of bankruptcy filers as either immoral individuals who
chronically fail to honor their obligations or as strategic actors who are apt to abuse legal
protections to avoid debts.
Creditors’ targeted marketing to recently bankrupt families exposes a consequence of the
deregulated credit market—distressed borrowers are highly lucrative. The findings on creditors’
postbankruptcy behavior show that substantial segments of modern credit markets rely on
financial distress for their profitability. Bankruptcy law itself facilitates this business model,
making debtors’ names a matter of public record and lengthening the required period between
bankruptcy discharges to assure lenders that bankruptcy will not likely bar their future collection
efforts. Understanding the realities of how creditors contribute to the financial distress dynamic
has crucial policy implications. Bankruptcy law could be a powerful tool to shape creditors’
financial practices, not just debtors’ financial practices. Current law gives insufficient attention
to the collective harms imposed by the credit industry’s distressed-based profit model. Armed
with knowledge of creditors’ strategic lending behavior, policy makers can consider and
implement reforms that will reduce the credit industry’s incentives to engage in lending that
thrives when families suffer from financial distress.
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Part I of this Article documents the debtor-focused rhetoric that drove the bankruptcy
reform debate and shows how recent scholars have responded by emphasizing the need to
understand creditors’ contribution to the bankruptcy dynamic. Part II presents original empirical
data on creditors’ behavior toward families who have filed bankruptcy. The findings emphasize
the need for policy attention to the economics of consumer lending and its effect on financial
distress. Part III develops the implications of these findings for bankruptcy and consumer law.
An exclusive emphasis on “strategic” debtors is myopic. Law powerfully shapes the behavior of
creditors, and these incentives may be suboptimal or harmful to society. Effective consumer
credit policy requires a rich understanding of how lenders stimulate and profit from financial
distress.
I.

THE MODERN CONSUMER CREDIT ECONOMY
A.
The Debtor Debate
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)

made sweeping changes to the consumer bankruptcy system.8 BAPCPA was the final result of a
long struggle to narrow the availability of bankruptcy relief.9 The rhetoric of the reform debate
focused on accusations that debtors were engaged in “strategic” behavior—borrowing without
intention to repay and using bankruptcy as financial tool to avoid repaying those debts. The
principal policy response was to incorporate a means test into the Bankruptcy Code that would
screen families for the ability to repay as a condition for bankruptcy relief.10 The credit

8

Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended throughout 11 U.S.C.).
See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005) (chronicling history of efforts to restrict bankruptcy relief).
10
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)(2). Numerous critics have attacked the means test. Some have complained that it
creates a large administrative and expense burden that is not justified by the few families who are subject to the test.
See Charles Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 16 (2001)
(concluding that then-pending “means testing would create a huge new bureaucratic burden for courts, trustees,
debtors, and debtors' attorneys--for everybody in the bankruptcy game, that is, except creditors.”); Elizabeth Warren,
A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 483, 506 (1997) (describing potential of
9

7

industry’s characterization of debtors as strategic actors was challenged with empirical evidence
on the problems facing families who seek bankruptcy relief.11 Researchers documented the low
to moderate incomes of most families in bankruptcy,12 and pointed to decades of research
confirming that job problems, illness/injury or family break-up were pandemic in the bankrupt
population.13 However, efforts had an unintended effect. They reinforced debtors as the focus of
bankruptcy reform, subtly helping to ensure that policy proposals avoided creditors’ activities.
This section briefly describes the credit industry’s strategic-debtor model of bankruptcy and its
influence on amending the Bankruptcy Code.
Attempts to show that the rising bankruptcy rates was the result of debtors’ strategic
behavior was persistent tool in the decade-long effort to enact bankruptcy reform.
Commissioners who dissented from the National Bankruptcy Review Commission’s
recommendations for the consumer bankruptcy system expressed concern about debtors’
incentives under bankruptcy law. They claimed the existence of a “[g]rowing perception that

means testing to harm consumer bankruptcy system as social safety net). Others have offered better systems to
accomplish the goal of ensuring that creditors are repaid if a family can repay. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela
M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 666
(2005); Jean Braucher & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Means Measurement Rather than Means Testing: Using the Tax
System to Collect from Can-Pay Consumer Debtors After Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6 (Feb. 2003).
11
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 256 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (statement by Elizabeth
Warren) (2005). Some representatives cited the findings of these studies in the debates about bankruptcy reform.
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H1979 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Scott) (“[W]hile some who file
bankruptcy have been financially irresponsible, the overwhelming majority of those who file do so as a result of
divorce, major illness, or job loss. Half of those who go into bankruptcy do so because of illness, and most of them
had health insurance but still could not pay their bills.”)
12
See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ETAL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 61-62 (2000) (finding that
the median income for those who file bankruptcy is almost half the national median); Marianne B. Culhane &
Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7
Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27, 37 (1999) (reporting that only 24% of those in bankruptcy had incomes
above the national median). My own pre-BAPCPA scholarship focused on debtors’ circumstances as well. See
Katherine Porter, Going Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of Rural Failure, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 971, 973
(documenting that rural bankruptcy debtors have more severe economic circumstances than urban bankruptcy
debtors and using this finding to argue that bankruptcy reform could particularly harm rural families).
13
See SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 12 at 186; WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 3, at
81 tbl. 4.1; Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt, 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
116, 142 (2002).
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bankruptcy has become a first resort rather than a last measure for people who cannot keep up
with their bills.”14 The credit industry formed organizations to advocate for bankruptcy reform
and hired powerful lobbyists to assert this perception of why consumers file bankruptcy.15
Reform proponents focused on the incentives created by a Chapter 7 discharge, asserting that
some bankruptcy filers received new credit shortly before bankruptcy or filed bankruptcy even
though they were not in default.16 Congressional representatives echoed these fears about
strategic or immoral debtors. Bankruptcy was “just another tool of financial management” for
too many families looking to “skip out” of their debts.17 Prodigality and strategic rationality were
wedded together in the strongest characterizations of debtors as immoral actors. Representative
Gekas lamented that “bankruptcy has become a way for reckless spenders to escape their
debts.”18 Advocates of bankruptcy reform deployed an alternate argument that the bankruptcy
system effectively amounted to a $400 tax on each American family each year.19 This
“economic” approach incorporated moral concerns too, however, since the persuasive power of
this argument was ostensibly that such a tax was unfair to “moral” and “responsible” families
who repaid their debts and did not file bankruptcy. Overall, the debate centered on

14

REPORT OF THE NAT’L BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, ch. 5 (1997) (Recommendations for Reform of
Consumer Bankruptcy Law by Four Dissenting Commissioners, at 2).
15
Dickerson, supra note 3, at nn. 78-84 and associated text (forthcoming 2007) (collecting accounts of
bankruptcy reform that rely on public choice theory to show influence of credit industry in enactment of legislation);
Jensen, supra note 9, at 498-99 (describing efforts of the Bankruptcy Issues Council, the Consumer Bankruptcy
Reform Coalition, and the American Financial Services Association in lobbying for restricting bankruptcy relief.)
16
NAT’L BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REVIEW, ch. 5, supra note 14, Additional Dissent to Recommendations for
Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law at 11.
17
144 CONG. REC. 21594, 21643 (1998) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The fact is that some people use
bankruptcy as a convenient financial planning tool to skip out on debts that they could repay.”)
18
National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1997) (statement of Rep. Gekas).
19
See Elizabeth Warren, The Phantom $400, 13 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 77 (2004) (chronicling history of
bankruptcy tax figure and its role in lobbying efforts for bankruptcy reform).
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characterizations of debtors as strategic actors who reacted in immoral ways to undesirable
incentives that bankruptcy law created for borrowers.20
When policymakers did focus on the lending industry, the principal complaint was the
intensity of creditors’ lobbying efforts to enact bankruptcy reform. Representative Henry Hyde
critiqued the substance of the proposed legislation, but added the following postscript: “Lastly,
let me pay my respects to the creditor lobby. They are awesome.”21 Mechele Dickerson has
suggested that this public choice focus on lobbying and campaign contributions shortchanged the
policy debate.22 She identifies the ideological underpinnings of the bill as a struggle about the
scope of “personal responsibility” that bankrupt families should bear for their financial distress.23
However, this description bankruptcy’s ideology largely ignores the possibility of such a debate
as a forum for discussing the appropriate responsibilities of creditors.
Some legislators made periodic efforts to highlight perceptions of hypocrisy by creditors
who complained about overindebted debtors while continuing to lend to these customers.24 Such
efforts were diluted by the panoply of alternate arguments raised against the proposed
legislation.25 Although the final bill included “Consumer Protection” in its title, the legislation
made only modest reforms to creditor practices, which focused on additional disclosures in credit

20

Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 376. (“In particular, the debates often focused on . . . the concern that the
skyrocketing bankruptcy filing rates indicate that consumers are using the bankruptcy system for financial planning
purposes.”)
21
145 CONG. REC. 2723-2724 (daily ed. May 5, 1999) (statement by Rep. Hyde on H2718).
22
Dickerson, supra note 3, at 20.
23
Id.; Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 376 (“For the most part, proponents relied on moral arguments—how
shameful it is that Americans walk away so easily from their debts.”)
24
Jensen, supra note 9, at 520, n. 199. “Members who opposed the legislation argued that the increase in
bankruptcy filings was due to the credit card industry itself, which, they claimed ‘actively solicits unsuspecting
consumers through the mail with terms of easy credit . . . addicting debtors to this financial crack.’” (quoting
statement of Rep. Jackson Lee made in opposition to a 1999 bankruptcy reform bill).
25
Opponents complained that various versions of the legislation were too complicated, would be too costly to
implement, were unfair to women, were drafted without the input of bankruptcy experts, were technically defective
and internally inconsistent, and would not halt the worst instances of abuse in the system. For a representative
sampling of these critiques during the entire bankruptcy debate, see Jensen, supra note 9.
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contracts.26 BAPCPA did require the Federal Reserve to conduct a study on “consumer credit
industry practices of soliciting and extending credit—(A) indiscriminately; (B) without taking
steps to ensure that consumers are capable of repaying the resulting debt; and (C) in a manner
that encourages consumers to accumulate additional debt.”27 The purpose of the study was to
examine the “effects of such practices on consumer debt and insolvency.”28 This provision
“sense of Congress” may be a tangible reflection of frustrations about the paucity of quantitative
data about creditor practices.
The required report was issued in June 2006 and bore the promising title, “Report to
Congress on the Practices of the Consumer Credit Industry in Soliciting and Extending Credit
and their Effects on Consumer Debt and Insolvency.”29 Yet, it contained no new data and yielded
few insights on actual credit practices.30 Notwithstanding the lack of empirical evidence, the
report issues a “key finding” that “as a matter of industry practice, market discipline, and
banking agency supervision and enforcement, credit card issuers do not solicit customers or
extend credit to them indiscriminately or without assessing their ability to repay.”31 The report
concluded that “[c]onsideration of an existing or potential customer’s ability to repay is a major

26

Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 1301-1306; 19 Stat. 23, 204-213.
Id. at § 1229; 19 Stat. 23, 200.
28
Id.
29
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PRACTICES OF THE CONSUMER
CREDIT INDUSTRY IN SOLICITING AND EXTENDING CREDIT AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CONSUMER DEBT AND
INSOLVENCY (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/bankruptcy/bankruptcybills
tudy200606.pdf.
30
See Warren Reports on the Middle Class, TPM Café, Problems? What Problems? Fed Paints Happy Face on
Credit Card Debt, (Aug. 8, 2006) (excerpting long statement from Ronald Mann on weaknesses with Federal
Reserve study pursuant to section 1229 of BAPCPA), available at http://warrenreports.tpmcafe.com/blog/warrenre
ports/2006/aug/08/problems_what_problems_fed_is_clueless; Pottow, supra note 6, at 418, n. 47 (describing
Federal Reserve report required by section 1229 of BAPCPA as “anticlimax.”) To be fair, Congress did not allocate
additional funds to the Federal Reserve to conduct this study and gave it only one year to complete the report. See
generally Katherine Porter, The Potential and Peril of BAPCPA for Empirical Research, 71 MISSOURI L. REV. 963,
972-976 (2006) (identifying reasons for skepticism about mandatory reports incorporated into BAPCPA).
31
FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON SOLICITING AND EXTENDING CREDIT, supra note 30, at 3.
27
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aspect” of credit solicitation and credit extension.32 This statement fails to evaluate how lenders
weigh repayment ability. In fact, lenders may consider ability to pay as a negative factor, rather
than a positive factor in their profit models.33 The mere fact that risk-scoring models include
measurements of propensity or willingness to pay does not mean that lenders limit lending to
risky customers. Indeed, lenders may profit from financial distress meaning that credit extensions
to troubled borrowers are not “indiscriminate” but deliberate.
The realities of such lending models (the subject of the next section of this Article) did
not sidetrack the rhetoric of bankruptcy reform from its obsession with strategic debtor behavior.
Lenders’ “strategy” in marketing and extending credit was an occasional sideshow, at best, in the
circus of Congressional debate. The role of bankruptcy law in incentivizing undesirable credit
activity was ignored entirely. To the contrary, the bill was heralded as a critical measure to
ensure that current lending practices were sustained in the future. When he signed BAPCPA into
law, President Bush explained that law “will ensure that more Americans can get access to
affordable credit.”34 The President expressed concern that debtor abuse of the bankruptcy system
has “made credit less affordable and less accessible, especially for low-income workers who
already face financial obstacles.” The opposite possibility—that families who are struggling
financially may have too much credit opportunity—did not receive serious policy attention.
Instead, BAPCPA was praised for its ability to help those who did seek bankruptcy relief “avoid
future credit problems.”35 This Article’s original data on credit marketing to former bankruptcy,

32

ID. at 26.
Mann, Sweatbox, supra note 1, at 384 (noting for debt-based credit card issuers the “most profitable customers
are sometimes the least likely to ever repay their debts in full.”)
34
Press Release, White House Press Office, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer Protection
Act (Apr. 20, 2005) available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html; see also
Jensen, supra note 9, at 566-67.
35
Id.
33

12

debtors provides crucial evidence for evaluating the effects of bankruptcy reform on optimal
credit use.
B.
Models of Consumer Lending
After BAPCPA’s enactment, several prominent scholars have tried to identify the stakes
of the credit industry in bankruptcy law and in financial distress more generally. This work has
documented recent changes in the economics of the consumer credit markets. These efforts
highlight the importance of data on the actual practices of lenders with respect to financially
distressed borrowers. Bankruptcy debtors are a useful sample for measuring how lenders react to
information that families face serious financial problems.36 While literature on postbankruptcy
credit is sparse, prior studies illustrate need for effective policymaking to be cognizant of
creditors’ role in the financial distress dynamic.
Scholars have disagreed on whether consumer debt correlates with bankruptcy, the most
common measure of financial distress in such research.37 Debates about causation have been
even more heated. Most research uses aggregate national data, due to weaknesses in household
data,38 and looks broadly at how the expansion of consumer credit tracks bankruptcy filings.39
Some studies have focused particularly on credit cards because card use and card debt greatly
expanded during the same period as consumer bankruptcy filings.40 This line of research
36

WARREN & TYAGI, TWO-INCOME TRAP, supra note 3, at 81 (showing that large fraction of families with
children who file bankruptcy reported either job problems, illness or injury, or a family break-up as a reason for their
bankruptcy).
37
See, e.g., Robert Lawless, The Paradox of Consumer Credit, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 348, 367-368 (2007); Teresa A.
Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical
Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STANFORD L. REV. 213, 248-250 & fig. 10 & 11
(2006) (charting changes in household debt using Federal Reserve data).
38
RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD 61-62 (2006).
39
See Robert M. Lawless, Relationship of U.S. Bankruptcy Filings and Consumer Debt 5 (Oct. 4, 2006),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934798.; FEDERAL RESERVE REPORT, supra note 30, at 18 tbl. 6.
40
See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J.
249 (2007); MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 38; Todd Zywicki, Credit Card Economics, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79
(2000); Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest Rate Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Charge-offs, and
the Personal Bankruptcy Rate, BANK TRENDS, (May 1998).
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generally concludes that climbing consumer debt burdens have some substantial relationship
with higher bankruptcy filings.41 These findings are limited by the fact that aggregate data reflect
“only a typical household and may not be indicative of financial distress.”42
Prior Consumer Bankruptcy Project research has yielded useful household-level data on
the economic characteristics of families in bankruptcy.43 These findings offer a “snapshot” view
of the debt obligations of families at the time that they seek bankruptcy relief. They do not
illuminate how families accrue debt over time or what proportion of debt corresponds to
borrowing shortly before bankruptcy. The credit industry, which surely tracks these trends, did
not offer proprietary data on these points during the bankruptcy reform debate,44 choosing to
evidence the strategic debtor model with anecdotes, not empirics.
Despite public lamentations about failure to pay, the credit industry may in fact seek out
such families. Two recent articles explain this phenomenon and illuminate how current law
permits creditors to a profit by strategically targeting families in financial distress. Drawing on
behavioral economic theories, Susan Block-Lieb and Edward Janger have explored how the
“myth of the rational borrower” dominates bankruptcy and consumer credit policymaking.45
They describe how this construct drives fears that the “Bankruptcy Code encourages inefficient
and opportunistic ex ante decisionmaking.”46 Block-Lieb and Janger contrast this theoretical
portrayal of borrowers with the reality of creditors’ continued expansion of the market for credit,
noting that the success of the business strategy of subprime lending requires that “nonstrategic
41

MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 38, at 69.; see also FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON SOLICITING AND
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See generally Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 2.
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Id. at 1486.
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borrowers must outnumber the strategic borrowers and the interest and fees paid by (at least
some) nonstrategic borrowers must outweigh the costs of strategic borrowers’ defaults.”47 In
their view, consumer credit policy evinces a misplaced focus on borrower rationality.48 They
argue that technology facilitates lender opportunism by permitting the credit industry to
accurately target highly profitable borrowers who are likely to incur fees, interest, and other
charges that feed superior profit margins.49 Lenders exploit financial distress in this strategic
manner, leaving bankruptcy (and other social institutions) to address the harm caused by
overborrowing.
This model of consumer lending suggests that the credit industry’s motivation for
bankruptcy reform was not realigning borrower incentives. Ronald Mann has developed an
alternate explanation for how creditors may benefit from bankruptcy reform.50 Focusing on
credit card issuers,51 Mann sketches a “dynamic of profitability” how financially distressed
borrowers generate hyper-profits.52 He contrasts this new lending model with conventional loans
to illustrate how financial distress—at least to a point—fuels, rather than depresses revenue.53
Indeed, credit card companies enjoyed record profits as the bankruptcy rate escalated.54 Mann
identifies ways that BAPCPA may enhance profits from families in financial distress by delaying

47

Id. at 1488.
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Id. at 385.
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or deterring bankruptcy.55 Growing recognition of such lending models has spawned law reform
proposals that aim to limit such lending or to force lenders to internalize the harms of financial
distress.56
This Article applies this prior research to a particular example of lenders’ interest in
financially distressed customers. Families who file bankruptcy face challenges in achieving
financial well-being, even after a bankruptcy discharge.57 Just one year after bankruptcy, a
substantial minority of families report that their financial position has worsened or failed to
improve.58 Many struggle to meet ordinary expenses.59 Examining the availability of
postbankruptcy credit complements efforts to understand lenders’ role in financial distress. As an
example of a population in financial trouble, postbankruptcy families illustrate the breadth and
depth of credit markets for distressed customers generally.
Existing longitudinal research on bankruptcy debtors is sparse. Most evidence is
anecdotal and did not focus squarely on creditors’ behavior toward bankrupt families. This
literature does usefully reveal the range of perceptions about postbankruptcy credit and illustrates
the need for recent data that reflect the modern consumer lending market.
Accounts of the availability of postbankruptcy credit differ greatly. Many people
considering bankruptcy, and indeed many who file bankruptcy, apparently believe that
bankruptcy will devastate their ability to borrow.60 The general public may have a similar
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Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 91-92
(2006) (describing financial issues facing families whose self-reported financial condition worsened after
bankruptcy).
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Id. at 84, Fig. 1 (reporting that 25% of Chapter 7 debtors in study reported difficulty in paying bills one year
after bankruptcy.)
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The conventional wisdom that credit is hard to get after bankruptcy is typically spread by non-specialists. See,
e.g., Michael Moody, Obtaining Credit After Bankruptcy: Mission Impossible (Oct. 16, 2006),
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perception, which could effect how they view families who chose bankruptcy.61 These
perceptions are curious because concern about widespread marketing to postbankruptcy families
dates back over thirty years. An empirical survey of bankruptcy practitioners, judges, and
academics in 1973 reported that participants saw the “problem of ‘aggressive solicitation of
recently discharged bankrupts’ as very important.”62 These respondents were experts in
bankruptcy, however, and they possessed insider knowledge of the bankruptcy system that the
general public lacks. In recent years, newspapers have featured the rampant solicitation of
families after bankruptcy.63 In an April 2005 story, the Washington Post profiled a woman who
tried to avoid credit cards after bankruptcy but accepted one of many “preapproved” offers that
she received because she found it hard to rent a car without a credit card. The story noted that
firms specialize in marketing to bankrupt consumers and quoted their advertising materials
trumpeting “unique and lucrative market.”64 The New York Times used the experience of one
bankruptcy filer to shape its story, sharing her reports that every day she got “at least two or
three new credit card offers—Citibank, MasterCard, you name it—they want to give me a credit
card.”65 Quotes from banking industry representatives reflected some variation in credit

http://ezinearticles.com/?Obtaining-Credit-After-Bankruptcy:-Mission-Impossible&id=330141 (advising potential
bankruptcy filers that they likely will not be able to get credit for at least a year or two after bankruptcy); Total
Bankruptcy website, What the Credit Industry Doesn’t Want You to Know About Bankruptcy,
http://www.totalbankruptcy.com/credit_industry_secrets.htm (debunking the myth that you cannot get credit after
bankruptcy).
61
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Negatives
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Positives,
http://www.citibank.com/us/cards/cm/cntrol07.htm.
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Selwyn Enzer, Raul de Brigard, & Frederick D. Lazar, Some Considerations Concerning Bankruptcy Reform
at 90 (March 1973) in REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Part III
(July 1973).
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marketing to recent debtors,66 but neither news story turned up any industry or government data
to support the extent and nature of postbankruptcy credit availability.67
More systematic research about postbankruptcy credit is quite dated. Given rapid changes
in the lending environment, these data may not be reliable for policymaking. However, these
studies illustrate how prior researchers have approached the topic of postbankruptcy credit.
Fifteen years ago, Jean Braucher conducted qualitative research about the attitudes and practices
of consumer bankruptcy attorneys.68 Although her study had a much broader focus,69 Braucher
assessed the perceptions of debtors’ attorneys about postbankruptcy access to credit. Braucher
found that lawyers are frequently asked about the impact of bankruptcy on future credit,70 wither
her interviews causing her to conclude that “[m]ost debtors who consult bankruptcy lawyers are
concerned about future access to credit,” She noted that while “nearly all” lawyers give advice to
clients on this matter, that most do so without the benefit of accurate information.71 Most lawyers
believed that Chapter 7 debtors had fast access to credit after bankruptcy and had experiences
with clients being offered new credit immediately after filing bankruptcy (even before
discharge.)72 Many attorneys expressed concern about the easy access to postbankruptcy credit.73
This concern caused some attorneys to understate the availability of credit to potential Chapter 7
66

Id. (describing different approaches reported by Bank of America and Citibank)
The Washington Post article reported preliminary data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project sample that is
the basis for this Article’s analysis. Mayer, supra note 64, at A9.
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See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501,
516 (1993).
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70
Id. at 537.
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availability after chapter 7 and chapter 13 based on feedback from former clients, and nearly all give advice on this
basis.”).
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Id. at 538.
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Id. (“Many lawyers said that it is common for debtors to obtain credit within a year or two of a chapter 7 filing.
“It's too easy to get new credit,” said one lawyer. Another said, “the credit industry is recycling people.” Car loans
and credit cards can often be obtained quickly after filing a chapter 7 case, the lawyers in all four cities said.”).
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debtors.74 Braucher also identifies attorneys’ desire to have clients file Chapter 13 as a factor that
dampens lawyers’ disclosure about credit availability after Chapter 7 bankruptcy.75 Attorneys
apparently use their impressions about the type of credit, not just the availability of credit, to
bolster their preference for Chapter 13 cases.76 Several lawyers believed that after a Chapter 7
bankruptcy, the available credit was “often at the highest rates and from the sleaziest
purveyors.”77 Apparently, these attorneys believed credit would be cheaper or offered on more
favorable terms after a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Braucher does not identify whether the attorneys
had any evidence for these beliefs. These attorney impressions have a critical impact on the
bankruptcy system because they shape debtors’ decisions about whether to file bankruptcy and
what type of relief to seek.78 However, the research does not have sufficient data on
postbankruptcy credit to use it as a lens for understanding creditors’ assumptions about and
behavior toward bankruptcy debtors.
Two empirical studies more precisely document the landscape of postbankruptcy credit.
Each researcher used proprietary data drawn from bankruptcy filers’ credit reports. Michael
Staten of the Credit Research Center examined the credit reports of 2,000 people who filed
bankruptcy between 1978 and 1988.79 In the twenty to thirty years since that study’s families
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Id. at 540.
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filed bankruptcy, the variety and quantity of subprime credit has exploded,80 and Americans have
loaded up on debt.81 These changes may undercut the applicability of the study to today’s credit
markets. Nonetheless, it offers a useful methodology for examining the availability of
postbankruptcy credit. Staten did not measure credit solicitations but instead focused on actual
uptake of credit by families during the postbankruptcy period.82 Creditors who had lent
prebankruptcy to these families accounted for a significant fraction of the credit that debtors
accepted. One year after bankruptcy, 25.5 percent of new credit lines accepted by debtors were
issued by prior creditors.83 Staten hypothesizes that an indeterminate amount of this new credit
could result from pre-screened offers that were processed before the debtors filed bankruptcy,
but offers no evidence of this effect. His conjecture may reflect surprise at the substantial
fraction of creditors who chose to quickly lend again to bankrupt families.
The second study of postbankruptcy credit analyzed the effect of the law prohibiting a
bankruptcy that was filed more than ten years prior from appearing on a credit report.84 David
Musto found that consumers’ FICO credit scores jumped significantly after a bankruptcy was
expunged from their reports,85 and that this boost in apparent creditworthiness corresponded with
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debtors’ acquisition of new bank credit cards.86 Musto’s research nicely illustrates how law can
and does shape creditors’ responses to families who file bankruptcy. Because Musto is studying
postbankruptcy credit at such a distant moment—ten years after the bankruptcy filing—his
research does not reveal the immediate reactions of the lending industry to bankruptcy. The
ability to make inferences about postbankruptcy credit and financial distress is greatest when the
time between bankruptcy and the measure of new credit offers is short.
The prior research is insufficient to permit a nuanced analysis of postbankruptcy credit
availability. This gap in the existing literature contributed to the dominance of the strategicdebtor model and helped shield lenders from scrutiny.
CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES AFTER BANKRUPTCY

II.

This Article analyzes original data from the only large longitudinal study ever conducted
of consumer bankruptcy debtors. These empirical data expose the reaction of the credit industry
to consumer bankruptcies—to repeatedly solicit bankrupt families to become new credit
customers. Debtors’ reports of the vast market of postbankruptcy credit offer insights on lenders’
assumptions about the causes of bankruptcy and the need for bankruptcy reform. The findings
show how the credit industry seeks to profit from financial distress.
A.
Methodology
This section describes the study’s methodology and presents general findings about the
respondents. The original data in this Article were collected during Phase III of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project (CBP), which began in 2001 and ended in 2004.87 CBP III was a large,
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interdisciplinary study of consumer bankruptcy that involved a dozen researchers.88 The sample
consists of consumer bankruptcy cases filed in the first months of 2001 in five judicial districts
across the nation.89 The study had a “core” sample designed to be representative of all
bankruptcy filers and several specialized samples to study particular issues. This Article uses
data only from the core sample. The total core sample contains 1,250 consumer bankruptcy
cases, consisting of 780 Chapter 7 bankruptcies and 470 Chapter 13 bankruptcies.90 The ratio of
sampled Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases reflected the distribution in each judicial district in the
sample.
CBP III used four instruments to gather data. First, a questionnaire was distributed to
debtors at their meeting of creditors, a required part of the bankruptcy process.91 The
questionnaire requested demographic information such as age, occupation, and marital status,
and inquired about the family’s reasons for seeking bankruptcy relief.92 For each debtor who
completed a questionnaire, researchers coded data from the debtor’s corresponding public court
records, second data instrument. These bankruptcy petitions and schedules provided detailed
information about the debtors’ assets, liabilities, income, and expenses at the time of their
bankruptcies.
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Additional descriptions of the methodology used in CPB Phase III—2001 have appeared in numerous articles
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The questionnaire invited debtors to participate in a series of follow-up telephone
interviews in return for compensation of $50 per interview. Approximately one year after
bankruptcy, a small team of trained researchers conducted telephone interviews with 601
families in the core sample.93 Approximately three years after the debtors filed bankruptcy (the
spring of 2004), researchers attempted to contact each respondent that completed the first
telephone interview to conduct a second telephone interview. These second-round interviews
were conducted with 474 families in the core sample. Thus, all four data instruments
(questionnaire, court records, one-year interview, and three-year interview) are available for 38
percent of the original sample of 1,250 consumer bankruptcy cases.
Both the one-year and three-year telephone interviews were approximately one hour long
and were conducted using computer-assisted interviewing technology. A general set of questions
was posed to every participant. Based on corresponding questionnaire or court record data, some
participants were asked subsets of questions on topics such as homeownership and medical debt
that pertained to their situations. The research team coded all responses into a specially designed
database for each round of interviews. Most questions were closed-ended, although several
points in the interview invited unstructured or supplementary responses. Because this was the
first-ever detailed longitudinal study of consumer bankruptcy debtors, the families’
postbankruptcy experiences were the principal focus of each interview.
For most of this Article, I limit the CBP III core sample to include only debtors who filed
Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In Part II, E, infra, I analyze data from respondents who filed Chapter 13
cases to compare how postbankruptcy credit opportunities differ between Chapter 7 debtors and
Chapter 13 debtors. At that point, I explain legal differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
justify considering the two types of bankruptcy separately. Analysis of the demographic and
93
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economic characteristics of Chapter 13 respondents shows that these filers have higher incomes
and more assets, and are more likely to be married, employed, or homeowners when they file
bankruptcy than Chapter 7 filers.94 These significant differences are a further reason for
considering separately the experiences of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors.
The Chapter 7 sample used for this Article was narrowed from the 780 Chapter 7 cases in
the core sample to include only those cases in which a first round telephone interview was
completed. The longitudinal perspective of my analysis requires data on the postbankruptcy
experiences of debtors, and the telephone interview was the instrument used to gather such data.
Thus, the relevant sample (unless otherwise specified)95 contains 359 Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases
and captures 45.9 percent of the 780 Chapter 7 cases in the core sample.96
I compared the Chapter 7 telephone interview sample to the demographic finding of
previous bankruptcy studies.97 These studies measured common demographic and economic
characteristics of debtors, such as age, marital status, occupational prestige score,
homeownership, median annual income, and median unsecured debt. The respondents in this
sample appear consistent with the profiles of Chapter 7 debtors in prior studies.98 Primary
petitioners in the Chapter 7 telephone interview sample averaged 43 years old. Approximately
94

These differences were significant at the .05 level. The differences between the sex of the primary petitioner
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one-third were married and living with a spouse, while another 7 percent were married but living
separately. The median occupational prestige score was 36; occupations such as office clerk,
bricklayer, teacher’s assistant, and steel worker are represented by this score. Approximately 31
percent of the respondents reported that they owned their home at the time of filing. Families
earned a wide range of incomes. Eight households, or just over two percent of the sample, said
they received no income whatsoever. At the other end of the spectrum, one debtor reported
annual earnings of just over $101,000. Overall, median annual income for households in the
sample was $21,870, about half of the national average.99 Median unsecured debt was $27,528.
Like other researchers, I conclude that most bankruptcy debtors are demographically similar to
middle-class Americans but earn much lower incomes at the time of their bankruptcies.100
Debtors who completed the telephone interviews were self-selected, introducing the
possibility of respondent bias.101 To test for this, Dr. Deborah Thorne,102 the Project Director of
the Consumer Bankruptcy Project when the interviews were conducted, compared interview
participants and nonparticipants on several important demographic and economic variables.
Demographically, the two groups were comparable on the variables of age, employment status,
and homeownership. Interview participants were, however, significantly more likely to be single
and white than those who did not complete interviews. Analysis of the economic variables did
not reveal any statistically significant differences between the two groups. Debtors’ court records
revealed similar incomes, assets, and liabilities. Based on this analysis, the narrowed sample
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appears to be generally representative of the 780 Chapter 7 cases that comprised the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project’s core sample.103
To increase the longitudinal perspective on postbankruptcy experiences, I also present
data from the second round of telephone interviews completed in 2004. Of the 359 households in
the sample used in this Article (Chapter 7 cases debtors who completed the first round telephone
interview), 302 households completed a second interview approximately three years after each
family’s bankruptcy. This modest atrophy in the sample reflects the increased difficulty in
locating debtors as years elapsed after their bankruptcies and their completion of the written
questionnaire. I report the number of respondents with the relevant data and indicate whether the
data come from the first or second interviews. A comparative analysis of demographic and
economic differences between the first round interview respondents and second round interview
respondents showed no significant differences between the groups.104
B.
Soliciting Credit Customers
The availability of postbankruptcy credit was a principal focus of the longitudinal
interviews. The detailed data reveal how the credit industry responds to bankruptcy and support
assertions that the current economy for consumer credit relies on high-risk borrowing to
maximize profits.
Credit solicitation of recent bankruptcy debtors is rampant. Nearly all debtors stated that
they had received offers for credit in the first months following their bankruptcy.105 Figure 1
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illustrates that just one year after bankruptcy, 96.1 percent of debtors were recipients of credit
solicitations. Only 3.9 percent of families said they had not received credit offers. To the extent
that the conventional wisdom says that debtors will not able to borrow immediately after a
bankruptcy filing,106 the adage is neither wise nor reflective of today’s credit market.
FIGURE 1

Percent of Debtors Offered Credit and Who Accepted Credit
in First Year After Bankruptcy

96.1%
Offered New Credit

25.0%
Accepted
New Credit

3.9%
71.1%
Offered but Did Not
Accept New Credit

n=359

Most debtors did not accept new credit, reporting that they were avoiding the credit
industry entirely after bankruptcy. Debtors’ use of credit bears directly on the rehabilitative goal
of consumer bankruptcy and further research could consider how debtors use credit during the
crucial “fresh start” period after bankruptcy.107
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Debtors not only had the chance to borrow, they were inundated with solicitations urging
them to borrow.108 One year postbankruptcy, these families reported that creditors sent them an
average of more than fourteen credit offers per month. In practical terms, this means that more
often than not, each new day after bankruptcy presented these former bankrupts with a chance to
borrow. Table 1 gives summary statistics on the frequency of credit offers. While the reported
numbers ranged significantly, the typical (median) family said it got ten credit offers each month
on average. On an annual basis, this corresponds to more than 100 invitations to borrow.
TABLE 1
Frequency of Credit Offers Per Month in Year After Bankruptcy
Average

14.56

Median

10

St. Dev.

29.35

Number of respondents

339

Most debtors did not seem to expect these solicitations. Debtors’ expectations about
postbankruptcy credit were not a subject of the written survey that debtors completed shortly
after their bankruptcy filing.109 However, comments in the longitudinal interviews suggest that
some families were shocked at the response of lenders to their bankruptcy. A married man in his
early 30s from Texas expressed this reaction: “I was surprised at how fast they wanted to get you
back into the credit game, [at] all of the offers of credit. It was incredible. They sent us lots and
lots of offers for credit right after we filed. And I was told that it would improve my credit

postbankruptcy credit. These families may have a prebankruptcy credit line that was reaffirmed in their bankruptcy
and remains available for their use after bankruptcy.
108
Analysis of respondents’ answers to the question asking them to report the number of credit offers that they
get in a month revealed two suspicious responses of 300 offers per month (corresponding to 10 per day in a 30 day
month). These two outliers were removed before these data were analyzed, and the findings on credit offers do not
include these two individuals.
109
Researchers interested in understanding how debtors chose between the two types of bankruptcy relief could
fruitfully explore the role of credit expectation in the chapter choice decision.
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history.”110 Debtors gave vivid and colorful descriptions of the numerous credit offers that they
received after bankruptcy.111 A middle-aged real estate developer likened himself to “fresh meat”
out on the market, noting that it seemed like everyone was willing to help him get credit back.112
Families generally felt inundated with what they described as an “unreal” number of credit
solicitations.113
Indeed, families who have filed bankruptcy appear to be particularly desirable future
borrowers. Bankruptcy debtors seem to receive more credit solicitations than the general
American population. Industry researchers report that the average American gets six credit offers
each month.114 The average bankrupt receives sixteen, nearly three times the number directed to
the non-bankrupt family. A carpenter in his mid-30s warned that “[o]nce you filed for
bankruptcy, lenders come out of the woodwork. . . . They just really try to get you back in debt
again. I still get lots of offers [three years after bankruptcy] and just toss them.”115 Many debtors
noted a marked uptick in credit marketing after bankruptcy. An insurance claims worker
described her perception that bankruptcy improved her credit access. “All these offers that I get
for financing—Before I filed I bet I could not get a loan. The ironic thing is I’m sure, say within
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the six months before I filed, they would have laughed at me if I wanted to get a loan. Now they
are saying ‘let us give you money.’”116
The frequency and persistence of credit solicitations leaves many American families
feeling overwhelmed.117 Federal Reserve researchers found that 85 percent of consumers in a
study believed that credit card solicitations caused other consumers take on too much debt.118 In
response to complaints about the deluge of credit industry mail, Congress passed legislation that
allows families to opt-out of receiving prescreened credit offers.119 This regulatory intervention
enables families to intervene in the credit market by eliminating themselves as a potential
customer for new credit.

Opting out also can be a tool for financial discipline, reducing

marketing pressure to borrowing and helping consumers to take affirmative control of their
financial decisions.120 Yet, few families take advantage of the opt-out law, with the result that
credit solicitations are a reality of modern American life.121
Many debtors reported feeling frustrated, and even angered or scared, by the intensity of
credit solicitations after bankruptcy. Indeed, these families’ frustration with credit offers may be
even sharper than the typical American. These families’ downward spiral into bankruptcy was
116
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punctuated with efforts to borrow their way back to financial stability and increasing reliance on
credit to make ends meet. The number of dollars of debt discharged in bankruptcy was a tangible
and public signal of the depth of their financial collapse. Because credit was crucial (albeit
unsuccessful) strategy that they used in efforts to avoid bankruptcy, they may associate credit
with financial failure. Their financial collapse may heighten their consternation about credit
marketing and explain why such offers made many consumers feel vulnerable. When asked if
she had received credit offers, a Californian proclaimed, “Constantly! I’ve been pre-approved
more times than you can count. I just throw them in the trash. I actually got a $2000 credit card;
it suddenly arrived in the mail, a real, live credit card. I scissored it up into 17 pieces. You’d
think I was Donald Trump, the way they would send me credit cards. When I got that credit card,
I sat down and wrote them a blistering letter, but I doubt anyone ever read it.”122 This woman’s
disdain for credit solicitations seems to stem from her belief that she cannot afford $2000 in
credit card charges. Her perception that lenders’ credit offers threatened her financial recovery
after bankruptcy was echoed by many families.
Generally debtors disapproved of the aggressive marketing to bankruptcy filers. A
Californian said that getting credit cards after bankruptcy was “[n]ot as difficult as it should have
been. It just seemed almost too easy. They just sent a piece of paper and said that I’ve been
preapproved for $3000. It’s yours, just return the application.”123 This woman’s comments hint at
some anxiety about the consequences of the widespread availability of postbankruptcy credit. A
man in his mid-50s with some college education used the final open-ended question of the
interview to share his frustrations. “The bottom-line profit mentality we have in the United States
is one of the main issues here. I can’t believe how many credit applications are coming in even
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now.”124 This man’s shock at being a target of credit marketing is mingled with disdain. He
seems to think that lenders’ willingness to profit from a postbankruptcy debtor should be a cause
for policy concern.
These respondents’ concerns reveal an important consequence of the “democratization of
credit” that is rarely explored. Rather than seeing expansive credit as a benefit, families may
desire restraints on credit marketing as an aid for improving their financial practices.125 Optimal
policy must balance these desires against the goal of credit rehabilitation that is encompassed by
bankruptcy’s fresh start theory.126
C.
The Bankruptcy Beacon
The prior data show that lenders repeatedly solicit families who file bankruptcy. This
section explores the identity of these creditors and their knowledge about their potential
customer’s bankruptcy. The findings show that the industry’s appetite for “deadbeat debtors”
results from neither miscalculation nor marketing mishap. Bankruptcy debtors are specifically
targeted to become new consumers of credit products. The public record of these families’
bankruptcy cases serves as a beacon that guides lenders to these lucrative customers.
One bank spokesperson has asserted that any credit card offers that it sends to people
who have filed bankruptcy are inadvertent.127 The data cast doubt on this denial. Major lenders
deploy sophisticated analytical tools to identify future customers and their anticipated
profitability. This strategy has been fundamental to the price and term differentiation that
124
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dominates the current lending environment.128 During the same period in which the bankruptcy
rate escalated,129 technology improved the credit reporting and scoring systems. Simultaneously,
marketing departments launched powerful incentives such as create “teaser” interest rates and
affinity programs to attract customers.130 Given this formidable marketing prowess,131 accidental
offers are probably rare. Most postbankruptcy credit offers could probably be prevented by the
industry’s technology, and the sheer numbers of offers that continue for years after bankruptcy
strongly suggest that very few offers were processed before the credit report showed the
bankruptcy.
The data suggest that lenders specifically target recent bankruptcy debtors. The evidence
to support this assertion comes from debtors’ reports about the credit offers. Figure 2 illustrates
two findings that strongly support the existence of a credit market for known bankruptcy debtors.
The phenomenon of postbankruptcy credit cannot be dismissed as merely incidental efforts to
solicit the general American population.
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FIGURE 2
Bankruptcy as Factor in Credit Solicitation (n=341)
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A vast majority of debtors had received credit solicitations that specifically mentioned
their bankruptcy. Nearly 88 percent of debtors reported that lenders had referenced the debtor’s
bankruptcy in their credit marketing. The prevalence of these offers reflects that at least some
creditors intentionally seek out recent bankruptcy debtors as future customers. When asked if she
had received any offers that mentioned her bankruptcy, a woman in her mid-30s affirmed
“almost all of them.” She described their content, “We want to help, bankruptcy specialist, blah,
blah, blah. It’s awful.”132 Another woman read an interviewer a loan offer that she had received
for a car. The solicitation explained, “Your name was obtained due to your recent bankruptcy
filing—don’t be alarmed. . . . We know that bad things happen to good people . . . We know that
in the 12 months prior to bankruptcy people may experience considerable anxiety and stress.
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With our help you could be driving a new car the same day your bankruptcy is discharged.”133
As an accountant observed, “They seem to be looking for people who filed.”134
Bankruptcy law facilitates these marketing efforts. Filing bankruptcy is a public act.135
Individual creditors and the credit reporting bureaus search the records to obtain the names and
contact information of bankruptcy debtors. Some companies specialize in trolling the court
records and selling lenders lists of bankruptcy filers.136 Lenders’ access to this information for
marketing purposes is probably an unintended consequence of the public nature of bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, the effect deserves policy attention.137 Amidst lamentations that the stigma of
bankruptcy is declining,138 lenders are capitalizing on bankruptcy records to market to debtors.
Notwithstanding the public rhetoric, creditors’ private message to these families is that far from
being pariahs, they are welcome customers.
Research on Chapter 7 debtors’ postbankruptcy experiences reveals the profit potential of
former debtors. In the first year after filing, many families face financial difficulty and must cope
with declining or stagnant incomes.139 People in financial distress are more likely to have
revolving accounts, to have exceeded their credit limit, and to use cash advances (which carry a
higher interest rate), creating what some researchers have termed “attractive cash flows.”140 If
families’ face difficulty in making ends meet after bankruptcy, their profitability potential for
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lenders is greater. Fee and interest income are a major component of credit card lenders’
profits.141 Other subprime lending products may also rely heavily on such revenue. These
families exemplify the ideal customers for lenders’ “sweatboxes.”142 These families may be slow
to pay; they may make only small payments; they may incur huge fees; and their balances may
negatively amortize. But they cannot seek bankruptcy relief. It is precisely this constellation of
features that makes postbankruptcy families particularly profitable for lenders.143 These families
will generate more profit than card holders who frequently pay off their balance in full but the
bankruptcy risk is mitigated. In effect, lenders escape anxiety about how long the borrower can
sustain his unstable position before bankruptcy. Free from price regulation,144 and staving off
efforts to curb the substantive terms of their contracts,145 the consumer credit industry can market
to families who are vulnerable to financial distress at a price and on terms that maximizes their
profit.
This profit potential explains perhaps the most remarkable fact about postbankruptcy
credit offers. As shown in Figure 2, a substantial fraction of credit offers are made by the exact
same entities that were creditors in these debtors’ bankruptcy cases. Over one in five debtors
reported receiving a credit solicitation from a lender that they could identify as a scheduled
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creditor in their bankruptcy.146 Given the incredible consolidation in the banking industry in the
last decade,147 this figure may substantially underreport the frequency with which prebankruptcy
creditors seek to become postbankruptcy creditors. Debtors may not be able to accurately
identify the bank extending credit in a particular offer. For example, a borrower may say that he
has a “United Airlines credit card”, without remembering that Chase Manhattan is the actual
lender. When Chase Manhattan later sends him an offer to have a “Chase PerfectCard” card,148
the consumer may not recognize that this offer emanates from the same bank that issued the
United Airlines card.149 Even taking the finding as is, however, the data show that some lenders
are undeterred by a bankruptcy discharge.
Some debtors are shocked to discover that the very creditor who told them that filing
bankruptcy would ruin their credit is now soliciting them as a customer.150 “I am continually
getting offers for credit cards. Even the cards that I listed on my bankruptcy still offer me more
cards but the interest rates are higher” explained a California woman.151 These families’ disbelief
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at receiving credit solicitations is probably tempered by some terms of the new credit offers. In
some cases, an offer for postbankruptcy credit disguises an attempt to collect discharged debt.
Ten percent of families whose prebankruptcy creditors solicited them after bankruptcy reported
that some of those offers had asked them to make payments on prebankruptcy debts.152 These
future offers of credit were presumably conditioned on the debtor making a “voluntary” payment
on debt discharged in bankruptcy. While these situations were relatively infrequent and were
documented in only two percent of all Chapter 7 cases in the sample, they are nonetheless
disturbing.153 A request to pay debt that was discharged in bankruptcy is prohibited.154 In some
instances, postbankruptcy credit was a vehicle for enticing families to repay discharged debts.
While a substantial minority of Chapter 7 debtors does, in fact, chose to repay a portion of their
discharged debts,155 the numerous credit offers that debtors received each month would seem to
make such repayments truly “voluntary” and not motivated by a need to obtain future credit.156
Nonetheless, any debtors who accept these offers reinforce creditors’ incentives to violate the
discharge injunction. Such fortunate creditors will get a double benefit. They will accrue the
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debtors’ attitudes about their prebankruptcy creditors.
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superior profits from postbankruptcy borrowing, but also reduce their loss from the debt
discharged in bankruptcy.
This complicated dynamic reveals the extent to which the credit industry is a repeatplayer market. A substantial fraction of creditors will try to engage the very same debtors in new
borrowing. Less than one year after receiving notice that these families were no longer obligated
to pay their debt to them, the very same creditors actively seek to lend again to these families.
Because a vast majority of Chapter 7 cases are no-asset cases in which unsecured creditors
receive no distribution of payment,157 these lenders are apparently quick to forget that their
desired customers are the same “strategic” and “immoral” borrowers who purportedly game the
credit system. This dichotomy between words and actions is stark. Profit opportunities appear to
motivate lenders to abandon any effort to stigmatize bankruptcy filers by denying them credit.
Instead, bankruptcy law facilitates postbankruptcy credit solicitation.
D.
Paradox of Secured Credit
Rather than eliminate credit, bankruptcy may, in fact, increase credit opportunity.
Debtors are specifically targeted by lenders. These findings offer a twist on the adage that
bankruptcy ruins one’s credit. This section discusses on the types and terms of credit that is
marketed to families after bankruptcy. These data expose differences between lenders that
suggest which segments of the credit industry rely significantly on financial distress to generate
profits.
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After bankruptcy, families receive offers for most types of common credit. Figure 3
illustrates the percentage of debtors who received different types of postbankruptcy offers. Most
debtors had access to both secured and unsecured credit.
FIGURE 3

Percent of Debtors Receiving Different Types of Credit Offers
(n=355)
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General purpose credit card offers were ubiquitous. Nearly 93 percent of postbankruptcy
debtors reported receiving a credit card solicitation. Filing bankruptcy is plainly an ineffective
technique for eliminating the phalanx of credit card offers that arrive in one’s mail. Whether you
pay your balance in full every month or declare yourself broke, the banking industry appears to
have a credit card product that is suitable (and profitable) for your financial profile. This finding
reinforces the segmentation of the card industry, and their efforts to reach customers who are
vulnerable to financial problems.158
158
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Retail charge cards were less common. Only about one in five debtors were solicited to
open these accounts. Debtors’ experiences may not be unique. Pre-screened retail card offers
may be less commonly sent to all consumers. The query about credit offers was not limited to
mailed offers, but consumers may not have counted point-of-sale offers made in retail stores.
Another possibility is that retail cards are less segmented than general cards. These products
could be one-size-fits-all, marketed with a rate and fees that reflect the creditworthiness and risk
of the entire borrower base. Recent bankruptcy filers may not meet retailers’ lending criteria. The
differential between general and retail credit card offers could suggest that many of the general
credit cards offered to postbankruptcy families were subprime products. Some cards may have
required collateral for the credit extension;159 others may have charged unusually high interest
rates or required consumers to pay unusually expensive annual fees.160 Further evidence to
support this hypothesis comes from debtors’ experiences in trying to actually get companies to
issue them credit cards. Three years after bankruptcy, 44 percent of debtors said they were
denied at least once when applying for a credit card. The interviews did not ask for detail about
these credit rejections. Given the large number of credit offers most debtors received each
month, I hypothesize that these rejections perhaps resulted from the debtor applying directly for
a credit card (such as when offered to them during a retail purchase), rather than responding to
prescreened solicitations mailed to postbankruptcy families. The credit offers that bankruptcy
debtors receive may be tailored to distressed borrowers and carry correspondingly high rates or
unfavorable terms.
159
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A majority of families received solicitations for secured loans after bankruptcy, although
these offers were somewhat less common than credit cards. Car loans are widely marketed to
debtors. Many debtors were surprised to receive these offers, expressing concern that the
substantial debt required to purchase a car would cause them financial trouble in the future. A
young man from Pennsylvania told his interviewer that he had gotten car loans in the form of
check, for up to $50,000 but that “[t]hey go right in the trash with the credit card offers.”161
Comparable data for the general American population on the marketing of auto loans was
not readily findable.162 However, bankruptcy debtors may be particularly likely to respond to
unsolicited offers for auto financing. Repossession of a car may have been the last straw that
precipitated a decision to file bankruptcy. Other families may voluntarily surrender a car in
bankruptcy or be unable to defend a lender’s motion for relief from the automatic stay. The fact
that families are lucrative targets for car purchases after bankruptcy reinforces the hardship that
accompanies bankruptcy.163 Characterizations of debtors as strategic financial actors flounder
against such reality. Lenders’ postbankruptcy marketing is tangible evidence of the financial
rebuilding process that debtors must undergo after bankruptcy.
Families who retain their homes despite filing bankruptcy are targets for second
mortgages or home equity loans. About three-quarters of homeowners reported that they
received offers to use their home as collateral to borrow. These loans carry the potential for
relatively large debts. The marketing of home loans to recent bankruptcy debtors offers is
consistent with evidence on the penetration of the mortgage industry deep into the subprime
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credit market.164 While a Congressman lamented the morality of a debtor who would buy a house
and then file bankruptcy,165 the lending industry was actively soliciting families to risk their
homes after bankruptcy by loading up on new debt.
Another way to measure creditors’ willingness to lend to debtors is to study debtors’
perceived difficulty of obtaining credit.
Three years after bankruptcy, families were asked if they had “been turned down for, or
had trouble getting” certain types of loans. Many families responded that one or more of the
queries were inapplicable because they had not attempted to obtain that type of loan.
Notwithstanding some rejections, most debtors who wanted to borrow after bankruptcy seem
able to do so. These data reinforce the findings illustrated in Figure 3 that debtors are not limited
to secured lending but can borrow without collateral too.
Figure 4 shows how families’ experiences in trying to obtain three types of credit after
bankruptcy. The overall trend was that families with financial problems may have greater access
to unsecured credit in the form of credit cards than to secured credit. Credit cards were
particularly easy to obtain. Three years after discharging any prior credit card debts in
bankruptcy, 60 percent of families had at least one new postbankruptcy credit card.166
Approximately 24 percent of these new credit card holders believed that their bankruptcy had
made it difficult for them to get these new cards. More than three in four families reported that
bankruptcy did not cause them to be turned down for credit cards.
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FIGURE 4
Families Who Had Difficulty Accessing Credit
(Three Years Postbankruptcy)
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Paradoxically, families found lenders more reluctant to lend to them on a secured basis
than to issue them credit cards, which are frequently, although not always, unsecured lines of
credit. Approximately 55 percent of those who financed a car purchase in the first three years
after bankruptcy reported having difficulty obtaining a car loan.167 Figure 4 illustrates that
families were twice as likely to find it difficult to get a car loan as to obtain a credit card. About
one in three families who obtained a home loan after bankruptcy said that their bankruptcy
caused them trouble in borrowing or caused their credit application to be refused.
The presence of collateral should reduce a loan’s risk, both directly by increasing the
lender’s ability to obtain repayment by foreclosing on the collateral and indirectly by enhancing
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This number reflects only those who tried to take out a car loan. Many debtors paid cash for a car purchased
after bankruptcy. These findings are discussed in detail in the next section on use of credit.
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the borrower’s incentives to pay.168 Thus, secured credit should facilitate borrowing to less
creditworthy consumers. In the commercial context, the most financially sound companies avoid
secured credit.169 In the consumer context, however, vulnerable borrowers like bankruptcy
debtors are more likely to struggle to obtain secured credit than unsecured credit. This
differential may reflect the greater experience of the credit card industry with subprime
borrowers, a trend that has arrived more recently in the mortgage and auto lending industries.170
Perhaps in the consumer context, lenders cannot attract postbankruptcy debtors to secured
lending products that fully reflect the expense of enforcing a security interest or monitoring
collateral. Former bankruptcy debtors may have a harder time qualifying for the available
secured credit products. Families may instead turn to credit cards to finance a car purchase
through a cash advance or to serve the purpose of a home equity loan such as funding a home
improvement project or paying unexpected medical bills. At least in the market for distressed
consumers, unsecured credit that excuses borrowers from risking collateral is more widely
available to risky customers than secured credit.
Lenders repeatedly solicit families who file Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Bankruptcy creates
obstacles for some credit transactions, but simultaneously guarantees a virtual flood of credit
solicitations marketed specifically to postbankruptcy families. The widespread availability of
credit starkly contrasts with assertions of bankruptcy debtors as immoral or strategic actors and
highlights lenders’ interest in these families as a source of profit.
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Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1997) (“Granting
collateral lowers the aggregate costs of a lending transaction by lowering the pre-loan perception of the risk of
default.”)
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Id. at 634.
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2006).
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E.
Chapter 13 Twist
This section compares how creditors react to Chapter 13 bankruptcy with the Chapter 7
findings presented in the prior parts of the Article. Legal differences in two main types of
consumer bankruptcy relief seem to translate into important differences in creditor behavior. The
data suggest that despite the focus of bankruptcy reform on increasing the proportion of debtors
who file Chapter 13 bankruptcy, lenders themselves favor Chapter 7 filers by offering them
easier access to credit.
In the vast majority of Chapter 7 cases, individuals receive a discharge of eligible debts
two or three months after they filed their bankruptcy case.171 The discharge effectively ends the
bankruptcy process for Chapter 7 debtors. No trustee or bankruptcy court supervises the credit
activities of debtors after discharge. The prior statement is equally true in Chapter 13, but the
discharge in Chapter 13 cases does not enter until the debtor has completed all required
payments, which occurs between three and five years after plan confirmation.172 Chapter 13
imposes obstacles to obtaining new credit. While making plan payments, debtors are required to
get authorization before obtaining new credit.173 Many trustees emphasize this requirement to
debtors,174 although in fact trustees may liberally grant such requests.175 Research on actual
borrowing by Chapter 13 debtors could illuminate the extent to which this credit restraint
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operates to curb the desires of lenders and bankruptcy debtors for borrowing during Chapter 13
cases.176
A brief analysis of credit marketing to Chapter 13 families powerfully illustrates how
bankruptcy law shapes the incentives of the lending industry. Most families who file Chapter 13
bankruptcy receive credit solicitations.177 More than three-quarters of families (76.7 percent) said
that lenders had sent them credit offers in the first year after their bankruptcy filing. However,
Chapter 13 families are significantly less likely to receive credit offers than Chapter 7
families.178 The reported rate for Chapter 13 families is significantly lower than the fraction of
Chapter 7 debtors (96.1 percent) who receive credit offers after filing bankruptcy. At least in the
short-term, Chapter 13 seems to be a modest deterrent to the credit industry’s efforts to turn
bankrupt families into customers.
Figure 5 shows the frequency with which Chapter 13 filers reported being offered
different types of credit during the first postbankruptcy year and illustrates the comparative
difference with Chapter 7 debtors. The differences were significant for all credit offers except
retail cards. 179 Lenders’ preference for Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors is most pronounced with
regard to secured credit loans, as general credit cards were the only type of unsecured credit that
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Further research could yield insights on how actual credit use during a Chapter 13 case may influence Chapter
13 outcomes as measured by plan completion and discharge.
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These data come from the Chapter 13 cases collected in the core sample in which a first round telephone
interview was completed. The same method was used for the Chapter 7 sample considered in Parts II A-D. First
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470 total Chapter 13 cases in the core sample. Note that these data reflect all families who filed Chapter 13
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at one year postbankruptcy filing. Indeed, the completion rate for Chapter 13 is notoriously low. See Scott Norberg,
Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 476 (2006) (67% of chapter
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Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 557, 571-74 (2001)
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showed a significant difference by chapter. Both car loans and second mortgages are
significantly less available to families who filed Chapter 13 than families who filed Chapter 7.
Perhaps the need to obtain permission for post-filing credit in Chapter 13 deters lenders; this
requirement theoretically adds expense and hassle to the loan transaction costs. Alternatively
(and to my mind, more plausibly), this difference may reflect the practical needs of Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtors. Families who file Chapter 13 may retain non-exempt assets
such as a car or home and continue making payments on the debt through their Chapter 13 plan,
curing any default that existed at the time of the bankruptcy.180 In contrast, Chapter 7 debtors
may surrender these assets in bankruptcy or be less likely to own them.181 Thus, lenders may
exert less effort marketing secured loans to Chapter 13 families because these families may be
less responsive to such offers.

180

See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3); see also ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW
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FIGURE 5
Chapter 13 Debtors Receiving Different Types of Credit Offers
Compared to Chapter 7 Debtors
T otal: Any T ype of Offer
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Even if Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 debtors have identical postbankruptcy borrowing
preferences,182 the law creates different lending risks to debtors based on the type of bankruptcy
filed. Because consumers can convert their bankruptcies from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7,183
unsecured credit extended to a Chapter 13 debtor after their initial filing would be subject to
discharge if the case were converted to Chapter 7.184 This effect may constrain the availability of
credit cards to Chapter 13 debtors while they are paying into their plans. Data on the number of
credit offers could help test this hypothesis. Chapter 13 filers said they received an average of
8.65 credit offers per month; Figure 2, supra, shows Chapter 7 filers’ average was 14.56 offers
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I do not make any assumption that families who chose Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 would, in fact, have the
same desire for or beliefs about the availability of postbankruptcy credit. Scholars have expended considerable effort
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Bankruptcy Courts." 17 HARVARD J. OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 801, 814-15 (1994); but no study has extensively
considered the role of this factor in shaping a debtor’s decision. Jean Braucher’s research on lawyers’ role in
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per month.185 A similar margin existed at the median, with the typical Chapter 13 debtor
receiving half (five per month) the number of offers of the typical Chapter 7 debtor (ten per
month.) The data do not permit a complete understanding of the reasons for Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 credit marketing. The less frequent credit solicitations to Chapter 13 families may
reflect the fact that some lenders simply avoid Chapter 13 debtors entirely. Marketers, in turns
may have more success selling data on Chapter 7 filers, who lenders prefer as customers.
Chapter 13 families were substantially less likely to report credit offers that mentioned their
bankruptcy or were received from a prebankruptcy creditor. Figure 6 shows these findings and
comparative data from Chapter 7 debtors.
FIGURE 6

Differency By Chapter:
Bankrupty as Factor in Credit Solicitation
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

23.2%
14.1%

Offer From Same Creditor in
Bankruptcy
Chapter 13 Debtors

Offer Mentioned Bankruptcy

Chapter 7 Debtors

Overall, lenders exhibit a customer preference for Chapter 7 filers over Chapter 13 filers.
This preference does not square with the credit industry’s backing of bankruptcy reform that
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allegedly would screen more families into Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Despite their rhetoric
championing Chapter 13 as the “honorable” path for families in serious financial trouble, the
lending industry is more likely to cast away a family who chooses Chapter 13. Congressional
representatives repeatedly emphasized the policy importance of partial debt repayment in
Chapter 13.186 However, lenders are less likely to reward families who chose Chapter 13 by
offering them additional credit. This differential treatment by creditors has implications for the
design of bankruptcy law.
Despite debtors’ trepidations and creditors’ warnings before bankruptcy, borrowing after
bankruptcy is not only possible after bankruptcy, such activity is actively encouraged by the
credit industry. These data suggest that creditors’ threats to refuse credit after bankruptcy are
hollow. The credit industry may tell consumers that they will not lend after bankruptcy and that
paying the debt is the only option to maintain their credit access, but such statements are largely
untrue. Rather than resulting from a marketing mistake, the widespread availability of
postbankruptcy credit more likely reflects a careful calculus about the profits of lending to
customers vulnerable to financial distress. The bankruptcy system shapes creditors’ ability to
profit from former bankrupts, and law can play a critical role in defining the appropriate
boundaries of credit solicitation.
III.

IMPLICATIONS
A.
Unraveling the “Strategic” Story
The findings about postbankruptcy credit solicitation do not legitimate the strategic

debtor model as a serious concern for lenders. Advocates of bankruptcy reform often conflated
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See 145 CONG. REC. 8509, 8580 (1999) (statement of Rep. Delay) (“Mr. Chairman, the bankruptcy bill under
consideration today is based on the premise that those debtors who can afford to repay their debt should do so, rather
than have it forgiven. To accomplish this seemingly simple goal, an income-based means test is employed to
determine if a debtor could do one of three things: have debt forgiven; reorganize and enter into a repayment plan;
or refrain from filing bankruptcy at all.”)
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prodigality with immorality, making it difficult to unravel the exact behavior by debtors (other
than the act of filing bankruptcy) that was undesirable. Some policymakers conjectured that the
stigma of bankruptcy had declined and suggested that families lacked the moral fiber to honor
their obligations.187 This view of bankrupt families suggests that debtors have serious character
flaws. Lenders’ rampant solicitation of bankruptcy debtors refutes this characterization of
bankruptcy filers as profligate and untrustworthy. If lenders believed that bankruptcy files were
inherent promise-breakers, they would not pursue them as customers. Positioned with public
knowledge of the bankruptcy and impressive technology for assessing risk, the credit industry
chooses to target bankruptcy debtors with credit solicitations. These efforts are inconsistent with
characterizations of bankruptcy filers as people who do not indent to or try to honor their
obligations.
The obvious response to this critique is to emphasize concerns that the prior bankruptcy
laws permitted consumers to engage in strategic borrowing before bankruptcy. This view does
not necessarily rely on immutable or chronic character traits. Instead, bankruptcy debtors are
portrayed as brutally rational actors, who ratchet up debt with the intent to use bankruptcy law to
escape repayment.188 This economic incentive analysis of consumer default emphasizes the
moral hazard of the bankruptcy discharge.189 This theory of consumer borrowing would not
expect families to default immediately after their bankruptcy because the law prohibits repeated
bankruptcy discharges in close proximity.190 Thus, creditors can market safely to these families
because the law assures them that bankruptcy will not be an immediate consequence of the
187

See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S50 (daily ed. JAN. 26, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Not long ago in our
Nation’s past, there was an expectation that people should repay what they have borrowed. Hand in hand with this
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borrowing. Without doubt, the ban on subsequent bankruptcy discharges has some effect on
credit marketing.191 But it alone may be insufficient to explain the desirability of postbankruptcy
families as customers. The basic economics of default and Chapter 7 support this point. Most
consumers default without filing bankruptcy and do so before bankruptcy; the amount of
charged-off debt significantly exceeds the amount of debt discharged in bankruptcy.192 The
simple truth is that creditors can go unpaid with or without a bankruptcy discharge. Over 96
percent of Chapter 7 filings are no-asset cases, suggesting that many families may be judgmentproof or nearly so.193 This reality means that lenders do not necessarily recover less because a
family chooses bankruptcy instead of “informal” bankruptcy—sustained nonpayment backed by
applicable non-bankruptcy law’s limits on debt collection.194 Similarly, after Chapter 7
bankruptcy, a majority of families could likely evade repaying any postbankruptcy borrowing
because they will continue to be judgment-proof. Future research could examine whether lenders
continue to offer credit as the time after bankruptcy elapses. To the extent that they do so, it
suggests that the ability to discharge debt in bankruptcy is not a major consideration in driving
lenders’ evaluations of a family’s desirability as a customer.
The findings on postbankruptcy credit marketing are inconsistent with the immorality or
strategic theories of bankruptcy debtors. To the extent that lenders believe bankruptcy indicates
poor character, the public act of bankruptcy guarantees that lenders can identify these families
and refuse them new credit. In this way, bankruptcy solves the information asymmetry problem
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See Part B, infra, for a discussion of ways in which bankruptcy law facilitates postbankruptcy credit
opportunity.
192
Ausubel, supra note 40, at 253 & fig. 1.
193
See supra sources cited at note 156; see also WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 180, at 350-51.
194
See Amanda E. Dawsey & Lawrence M. Ausubel, Informal Bankruptcy 1 (Twelfth Annual Utah Winter
Finance Conference, Working Paper 58, Feb. 2002) (stating that 50.7% of credit card loans were charged off for
reasons other than bankruptcy.); Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy? J. L. ECON.
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by flagging for lenders these families who are willing to file bankruptcy.195 More pointedly, if
lenders are seriously worried about the stigma of bankruptcy declining, they are in an ideal
position to deter such an effect. If creditors refused to lend to families after bankruptcy, families
who are considering bankruptcy may be more inclined to continue to struggle to repay their
debts. In this way, lenders did not necessarily need bankruptcy reform to address stigma
“problem;” they themselves could have sharpened consequences of bankruptcy. Instead, lenders
engaged in behavior contrary to their professed beliefs about the need for bankruptcy reform.
The postbankruptcy credit findings show lenders engaging in “strategic” decisions of their own.
During the very same years in which the credit industry pushed policymakers to enact
bankruptcy reform,196 creditors were hard at work trying to lure bankruptcy debtors as new
customers.
The extent of postbankruptcy credit solicitation is suggestive of lenders’ actual beliefs
about the causes of bankruptcy. Efforts to lend to postbankruptcy families are more consistent
with an adverse events model of bankruptcy than the “deadbeat” debtor model.197 The data are
not conclusive on this point; a bankruptcy filing clearly changes the ability of a consumer to
engage in strategic borrowing. However, lenders’ intense solicitation of postbankruptcy families
is consistent with an understanding of the consumer bankruptcy system as a refuge for decent,
honest families reacting to adverse events such as job loss or illness.198 These events are
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exogenous to a consumer’s desire or intent to repay. If bankruptcy were endogenous in origin
and primarily reflected a family’s willingness to engage in ruthless default, lenders should avoid
these families after bankruptcy for fear of future non-payment.
Creditors’ actions speak louder than their words.199 Despite public protests about
declining stigma and strategic debtors, creditors want to count these families among their
customers. Bankruptcy reform’s focus on debtors largely missed this insight.200 Lenders’
behavior toward postbankruptcy families highlights the need for policymakers to consider how
credit policy facilitates strategic lending and ways in which law could reduce undesirable
consequences of such behavior. 201
B.
Bankruptcy Incentives
The debtor focus of the bankruptcy reform debate hindered careful study of how
bankruptcy law shapes the behavior of creditors. In this section, I identify three ways in which
this Article’s findings on postbankruptcy credit opportunity could be useful in crafting
bankruptcy policy. Efforts to alter creditors’ legal incentives capitalize on creditors’ rationality
as a tool for improving the bankruptcy system.
Widespread postbankruptcy credit marketing is not an inevitable absolute, but is a
product of existing bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy discharges are not unlimited goods.202 The law’s
199
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prohibition on repeat filings facilitates creditors’ ability to profit from lending to recent
bankruptcy debtors. Eliminating a bankruptcy discharges removes one barrier to collecting the
debt and frees the creditor to continue collecting, during which time interest and fees accumulate.
The ban on repeat filing helps to insulate lenders from the risk of ultimate nonpayment (but does
guarantee repayment). In this way, the discharge limitation increases postbankruptcy credit
marketing.
Current law permits a Chapter 7 discharge only if a debtor has not received a discharge in
the prior eight years.203 This time period was lengthened as part of BAPCPA,204 a change that
should increase postbankruptcy credit marketing. Policymakers advocated this reform as
necessary to reduce debtors’ incentives to file bankruptcy as a financial planning strategy.
However, the sharpest effect of a discharge limitation may be on creditors, not debtors. The
repeat filing rate for Chapter 7 bankruptcies was already very low before BAPCPA.205 However,
lenders can exploit the extended prohibition on discharge to maximize profits from
postbankruptcy lending. Because many families continue to struggle to make ends meet after
bankruptcy,206 postbankruptcy families are ideal revenue sources for fee and interest income.
The practical effect of a bankruptcy discharge also aids postbankruptcy creditors. A
bankruptcy discharge frees a debtor from servicing prebankruptcy debts. From the new lender’s
perspective, the discharge has eliminated the competition for repayment. Instead of joining a
heap of other unpaid debts, early postbankruptcy creditors occupy an enviable position. The odds
of receiving payment are improved, and the ability to file bankruptcy is curtailed.
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An exclusive focus on debtors has impoverished prior policymaking on the optimal scope
of the bankruptcy discharge. The discharge does not just affect prebankruptcy debts; it has
powerful consequences for debtors’ fresh start after bankruptcy because it changes the context
for future borrowing. Acknowledging how creditors’ respond to bankruptcy enriches our ability
to evaluate the ideal boundaries of discharge. The postbankruptcy borrowing findings presented
here do not conclusively point to a particular reform, which should be supported by research on
how debtors use postbankruptcy credit. The data do suggest some immediate recommendations
for bankruptcy’s new financial education requirement.207 Education providers need to be
responsive to the reality of postbankruptcy credit solicitation in their curricula.208 The debtors’
reactions of frustration, anger, and fear about postbankruptcy credit marketing emphasize the
need to educate families about their ability to use existing law to opt-out of prescreened credit
offers. This modest recommendation integrates existing consumer law into BAPCPA’s financial
education requirement to aid families in capitalizing on their fresh start after bankruptcy. Debtors
could chose to eliminate solicitations for credit and wrestle affirmative control of credit
marketing from lenders.
The second implication for bankruptcy law derives from the findings on the relative
differences between postbankruptcy availability of secured and unsecured credit. The data
suggest a declining spectrum of credit availability from general credit cards to car loans to
mortgage loans. This pattern may be opposite of the ideal for facilitating debtors’ financial
recovery. Purchasing or refinancing a home is lauded as a wealth-building strategy,209 yet after

207

11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(11).
See Deborah Thorne & Katherine Porter, Financial Education of Families in Bankruptcy, __ J. of Consumer
Ed. ___ (forthcoming 2007) (articulating how education needs of bankrupt families may differ from general
population for financial education).
209
Edward M. Gramlich, Governor of Federal reserve, Remarks at Home Ownership Summit of the Local
Initiatives
Support
Corporation
(Nov.
8,
2001),
available
at
208

57

bankruptcy this may be the most difficult credit transaction to complete. On the other hand, new
empirical research suggests that credit cards, which are widely available after bankruptcy, may
stimulate financial distress.210 Current law does not attempt to influence these outcomes, perhaps
due to a lack of prior research. The law could treat certain types of postbankruptcy debt
differently in the event that a family experiences future hardship. While home mortgage debt
already gets favorable treatment in Chapter 13 bankruptcy,211 the law could create further
distinctions. For example, credit card loans made in the immediate aftermath of prior bankruptcy
could be subordinated to the obligations or barred from using wage garnishment as a collection
tool. Alternatively, the law could prohibit credit solicitations for a cooling-off period after
bankruptcy,212 or give debtors a defense of suitability for loans made after bankruptcy without
evidence that the debtor is likely to repay.213 This Article’s findings are alone insufficient, at
least in my mind, to justify such reforms. Credit availability after bankruptcy could, in fact, be a
powerful tool for helping families achieve financial well-being after bankruptcy.214 These data
may highlight the need for further longitudinal bankruptcy research.
Finally, the comparative findings on Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 credit availability are
provocative for policies aimed at favoring repayment as part of consumer bankruptcy relief.
BAPCPA’s means test was framed as an effort to increase the number of debtors who chose

http://www.federalreserve.gov/boardDocs/speeches/2001/200111082/default.htm (“For a family, a home is
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Chapter 13 bankruptcy and attempt to repay some of their debts.215 The postbankruptcy data
reinforce the improbability that creditors’ purpose in lobbying for bankruptcy reform was
increasing Chapter 13 filings as a proportion of bankruptcy cases.216 Creditors’ own actions give
over indebted consumers the opposite incentive—to choose Chapter 7 because it will afford them
greater access to credit after bankruptcy. At least during the first years after filing, Chapter 13
debtors seem to have less credit access than Chapter 7 debtors and face legal obstacles to using
credit. Additional research could illuminate whether Chapter 13 debtors do, in fact, have access
to more affordable credit after completion of their Chapter 13 plans than Chapter 7 debtors.
These findings could have important implications for bankruptcy professionals who counsel
potential debtors based on unsupported perceptions about difference in credit availability by
chapter. This Article’s data suggest that families may be misled in thinking that Chapter 13 will
improve their credit access, at least in the short term.217 Policy efforts to encourage Chapter 13
need to consider postbankruptcy borrowing and how law could shift lenders’ incentives to
enhance the attractiveness of Chapter 13. Collectively, the findings reinforce the conclusion of
Susan Block-Lieb and Edward Janger that “[i]t is senseless to look at consumers’ incentives to
borrow without also considering lenders’ incentives to extend credit. Thus, consumer bankruptcy
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law, and indeed all consumer law, should be crafted with an understanding of both sides of a
consumer finance transaction.”218
C.
The Expense of Profit
The story of postbankruptcy credit has implications beyond bankruptcy.

Recent

bankruptcy debtors are an exemplar of financially vulnerable Americans. Confronting lenders’
marketing to these families provokes consideration of the appropriate scope of lending to
financial distressed individuals. Such transactions may generate profits for creditors but impose
unacceptable costs on society and consumers.
Recent scholarship has posited that lending models no longer require full and timely
repayment for profitability. John Pottow has observed that this profit model “turns the
conventional paradigm of credit risk assessment on its head” and suggested some of these loans
may be “reckless.”219 Families who do not repay quickly or in full are the most profitable
customers for some lending products.220 These creditors rely for profit principally on income
from late fees, over the limit fees, and accumulating interest.221 Ronald Mann has detailed this
profit model in the context of debt-based credit card issuers.222 Subprime mortgages and car
loans may rely similarly on faltering repayment efforts to maximize profits; more research on
these transactions is needed. Certainly, products targeted specifically at financially-strapped
borrowers such as payday loans and auto-title loans rely heavily on fee revenue.223 Ultimate
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repayment may not be necessary for a highly profitable transaction. Block-Lieb and Janger have
observed that this profit model explains why rational lenders would have continued to expand
consumer credit and reduce their lending standards even as bankruptcy filings increased.224 Lost
profit from charge-offs or bankruptcy discharges can be offset by delinquency-derived revenues.
In this economic model, the higher bankruptcy rate is merely a consequence of different lending
criterion.225
Postbankruptcy debtors are even better candidates for the debt “sweatbox” or “reckless
loans” than prebankruptcy debtors. While the American Bankers Association’s president has
minimized credit card issuers’ interest in having financially distressed customers,226 a lending
industry publication has described the “trick” in subprime lending as finding consumers
who have “bottomed out” but is “looking to rebuild his life.”227 The reasons are easiest to
understand in the context of credit cards but could apply equally to other loan products. These
families have previously relied on cards (and on debt financing generally) so borrowing is part of
the family’s financial routine.228 They likely have few to no cards (and perhaps have other
cancelled loans) when marketing begins after bankruptcy so that postbankruptcy lenders increase
Berkley, supra note 170, at 2 (“Most subprime lenders are relying on fees as a countermeasure” to consumers with
“less than stellar credit”).
224
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the chances that their card gets used frequently rather than stored in a drawer with dozens of
others.229 Consumers may be particularly reluctant to switch lenders by transferring a balance (or
refinancing a secured loans) for fears of adverse activity on their credit report. These families’
desperation to rebuild credit after bankruptcy helps lenders avoid the “switching” consequence of
raising fees.230 Families may also believe that postbankruptcy credit options are uniformly
expensive and fail to shop.231 Thus, unlike with nonbankrupt consumers a “great new rate of
18%” may actually lure in customers.232 Finally, postbankruptcy families cannot discharge their
debts in bankruptcy for a period of years, reducing one source of loss for lenders.
With the exception of the latter limitation on bankruptcy discharge, former bankrupts
face financial circumstances similar to those of other populations who have attracted concern
about undesirable credit marketing. Several researchers have advocated for restrictions on credit
solicitations aimed at college students.233 Like postbankruptcy debtors,234 college students earn
low incomes but are anticipating higher incomes and improved financial circumstances in the
future. Thus, they may be attracted to borrowing to smooth consumption in anticipation of a
better future. Yet, many people will overestimate their future prospects and ability to service
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debt.235 Similarly to postbankruptcy debtors, college students also have few existing credit
obligations compared to typical Americans, allowing an early lender to enjoy a sustained period
of profitability. College students and postbankruptcy debtors both face difficulty in meeting bills
without borrowing. The credit industry’s intense marketing to postbankruptcy families parallels
their efforts to lure other vulnerable borrowers into lending relationships. Because bankruptcy is
a public process, recent bankruptcy debtors offer a useful group to study to understand creditors’
strategies for profiting from financially vulnerable consumers.
If lenders’ intense solicitation of such customers indeed is drive by these families’
propensity to pay late, go over the limit, and revolve large balances, society may wish to prohibit
or constrain such lending.236 Lending strategies that profit from financial distress may be
suboptimal because they force society to bear the costs of such distress.237 As Ronald Mann has
observed in another context, “lender’s incentives differ from the ideal incentives just as much as
the borrower’s incentives do.”238 Concern about the externalities of financial distress could
motivate policymaking designed to deter lending opportunism by shifting these costs to
creditors.
CONCLUSION
Consumer credit policies and bankruptcy law affect the well-being of millions of
American families. In the face of assumptions, theories, and lobbying rhetoric, empirical
research reveals the real world consequences of policymaking. This Article’s findings on
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postbankruptcy credit highlight the shortcomings of debtor-oriented debate about consumer
credit and bankruptcy. Efforts to lure recent bankruptcy debtors to borrow after bankruptcy belie
creditors’ characterizations of these families as immoral strategic actors. Rather than eschewing
them as profligates, the lending industry treats families who seek bankruptcy relief as a lucrative
source for profits. The widespread marketing to families after bankruptcy provides a powerful
example of the credit industry’s willingness and ability to profit from financially distressed and
vulnerable consumers. The law shapes creditors’ marketing and lending decisions to recently
bankrupt families, but this effect was hidden during the past decade of bankruptcy reform.
Understanding lenders’ incentives in the current credit market yields useful ideas on how
bankruptcy and other consumer law can improve credit policy and reduce the collective harms of
financial distress.
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